Task Force on Internet Shutdowns (TFIS)

The United Kingdom (the UK), a founding member of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), Chairs the Task Force on Internet Shutdowns (TFIS) alongside FOC Advisory Network (FOC-AN) members Access Now and the Global Network Initiative (GNI), and welcomes participation from FOC member countries and the FOC Advisory Network. Launched in December 2021 and set to operate until December 2023, TFIS serves as a multinational and multistakeholder coordination and response mechanism on Internet shutdowns. The Task Force works to improve coordination among like-minded countries, civil society, and the private sector to anticipate and respond to Internet shutdowns. This work builds on the FOC’s thematic and country-specific Joint Statements, including the 2022 Joint Statement on Internet Shutdowns in Iran, the 2017 Joint Statement and Accompanying Good Practices for Governments on State Sponsored Network Disruptions, as well as the 2021 G7 Leaders’ Communique and Foreign and Development Ministers Communique.

In addition to sharing information to help members address and respond to Internet shutdowns as they occur, the Task Force will share best practices for diplomatic engagement with countries that impose Internet shutdowns, develop a repository of resources on shutdowns, and coordinate engagement and response by TFIS members, as appropriate, with states that intentionally disrupt their own populations; access to, or dissemination of, information, knowledge, and data online.

TFIS defines Internet shutdowns as ‘measures intended to render Internet and mobile network services inaccessible or effectively unusable for a specific population or location and which stifle exercise of the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly online undermining the many benefits of the use of the Internet and ICTs’ (FOC Joint Statement and Accompanying Good Practices for Government on State-Sponsored Network Disruptions).

External Consultees

Select stakeholders outside of the FOC or Advisory Network may participate in the Task Force as external consultees by invitation of the Task Force co-Chairs.

Related FOC Statements

In October 2023, the Freedom Online Coalition issued a Joint Statement on Internet Shutdowns and Elections. 

With the development of the statement led by the co-Chairs of the FOC’s Task Force on Internet Shutdowns, the statement is endorsed by all 38 FOC Member States, and condemns intentional measures taken by States to undermine an open, free, global and interoperable Internet and digital communications platforms through shutdowns and network disruptions before, during, and following electoral periods.

The FOC calls on all States to commit publicly to refrain from restricting the Internet and digital communications amid electoral periods.

In October of 2022, the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) issued a Joint Statement on Internet Shutdowns in Iran. 

With the United States as the penholder, the statement is endorsed by all 34 member states of the FOC, and strongly condemns the measures undertaken by Iran to restrict access to the Internet following the nationwide protests over the tragic killing of Mahsa Amini. 

The FOC calls upon Iranian authorities to refrain from imposing partial or complete Internet shutdowns and blocking or filtering of services and to respect Iran’s international human rights obligations, including under articles 19, 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

In March of 2017, the FOC issued a joint statement expressing deep concern over the growing trend of intentional state-sponsored disruptions of access to or dissemination of information online. These disruptions challenge the FOC’s goal of protecting and extending an open and interoperable Internet, as affirmed in the Tallinn Agenda.

In addition to the joint statement, the Coalition issued an accompanying document which outlines good practices, and encourages all governments to refrain from network disruptions which stifle exercise of the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly online, while bolstering multi-stakeholder, participatory and inclusive Internet governance, strengthening Internet infrastructure, and improving transparency.

The statement is available in English, Arabic, and Russian.

Resources to share or use in engagements

Documents and contextualizes Internet shutdown cases around the world. The #KeepItOn FAQ explains core concepts.

The latest report (click to view summary) documented 182 Internet shutdowns across 34 countries in 2021. 

Disrupting Internet access makes it harder for candidates to campaign, for voters to access information, for the media to inform the public and act as watchdog, for internal and external actors to ensure transparency and trust, and for parties and voters to organize to pressure authorities.

To navigate shutdowns around elections, recommended steps include:

  1. Read about past/ongoing shutdowns and their connection to elections.
  2. Pre-install tools for circumvention and secure communication. Save key reference
    resources.
  3. During a shutdown, safely and securely share critical information within and beyond the region, including documenting human rights violations.

Monitors the Internet in near-real-time to
identify Internet outages affecting a network operator or a large fraction of a country.

Provides free and open source network measurement tools to measure Internet censorship, and openly publishes measurements to provide a public archive on network interference occurring around the world.

Internet Society Pulse consolidates third-party Internet measurement data from various sources into a single platform to enable stakeholders to better understand the health, availability and evolution of the Internet. 

The Pulse platform tracks:

  • Internet disruptions, and collects data-driven insight into their global impact;
  • Global deployment and adoption rates of key enabling technologies;
  • How well Internet connections maintain an acceptable level of service; and
  • The extent to which core services are concentrated among a few actors (centralisation).

Reviews recent developments, compares and ranks countries’ online freedom, and provides in-depth country analyses.

Network interferences are more likely at higher rates of Internet connectivity expansion, up to a tipping point. Shutdowns are increasingly ordered around civil unrest, contentious elections, and other security issues, either reactively or in anticipation of unrest, but they can actually cause unrest to increase.

Succinctly highlights socioeconomic harms of Internet shutdowns. Also available in Amharic, Arabic, Bengali, Chinese, Farsi, French, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Turkish.

Shutdowns can cause technical problems beyond the targeted region—e.g., by cutting off international network links, blocking access to applications hosted in the affected region, or overloading core Internet services with attempts to contact blocked domains. Partial blockages may draw attention to the blocked content (the “Streisand effect”).

Recommendations include building resilient infrastructure, ruling out all non-shutdown options, measuring costs first, diversifying voices (e.g., consulting SMEs that would be crippled), and performing watchdog functions (for CSOs and other stakeholders).